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ARTICLES 7 AND 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE-SECURITY INTERESTS
IN THE WAREHOUSEMAN'S OWN RECEIPTS
COVERING FUNGIBLES
C. PERRY BASCOM*
Among the vast introductory commentary on Article 7 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,' there is little specific attention devoted
to either warehouse receipts'2 or the interrelationship of Article 7 with
* Member of the lissouri Bar. The author acknowledges the pedagogical efforts of Professors
Robert Braucher of the Harvard Law School and Douglas G. Boshkoff of the Indiana University
School of Law, the latter having been a Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Law School during the
author's attendance. The accuracies herein are attributable to their tutelage, the inaccuracies
are the author"s oin.
I R BRAUCHER. DOCLXIENTS OF TITLE (ALl handbook ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as
BRAUCHER~] Boshkoff, Documents of Title: A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code
and Other Uniform 4cts, with Emphasis on Michigan Law, 59 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1961);
Braucher, 4rticle 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Documents of Title, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
831 (1964); Danielson, The Illinois Uniform Commercial Code: Article 7-Documents of Title,
50 [1 BAR J 766 (1962); Goldston & McKenzie, Documents of Title-Article 7 of the
t niform Commercial Code, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 280 (1962), Patton, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading and Other Documents oj Title: A Comparison of Texas Law and Article 7 of the
niforni Commercial Code, 31 TEXAs L. REV. 167 (1952); Rund, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of
Lading and Other Documents of Title, 16 ARK. L. REv. 81 (1961); Stroh, Article 7 of the
I niform (onmiercial Code: Documents oj Title, 30 Mo. L. REV. 300 (1965); Trousdale, The
I ni/orn? (omniercial ('ode: Article 7- Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading, 50 MINN. L.
REN 463 (1966).
2 An exception is Boshkoff, The Irregular Issuance of Warehouse Receipts and Article Seven
ol the t niqorm Commercial Code, 65 MICH L. REv. 1361 (1967). Those cases that have been
decided are collected in an annotation on the construction and effect of Uniform Commercial
(ode Article 7 in 21 A.L.R. 3d 1339 (1968).
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Article 9. One specific transaction which involves both of the above
topics is the lending of money by banks to warehousemen on the
security of warehouse receipts. Thig transaction has not been the
subject of appreciable commentary despite the early codification of
rules by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.4
A warehouseman who is also a dealer in the fungibles he stores, like
any other businessman, may need to borrow money. Like any other
businessman, he has a readily available source of collateral in his
stock in trade. The warehouseman approaches the banker who agrees
to lend him money on the security of his inventory. The banker,
realizing that a pledge by delivery of the warehouseman's grain is
impractical, agrees to accept the warehouseman's own receipts and to
hold these documents of title as collateral.
The agreed-upon payment terms usually provide for the release of
the collateral by the bank to the warehouseman so that he can sell the
grain and use the proceeds to repay the bank in liquidation of the
debt. From the banker's point of view, a safe and profitable loan has
been consummated. From the warehouseman's vantage, a workable
solution to his capital needs has been effected. Lawyers, by nature or
necessity, are captious and pessimistic. So for the lawyer who must
advise the banker beyond the "principle" agreement, the banker and
the warehouseman have, by this simple transaction, created an
intractible maze.
After preliminary research on documents of title, security interests,
warehouses and warehousemen, priorities, bankruptcy, administrative
law and statutory construction, the lawyer must isolate the following
questions to be answered before he can give the banker practical
advice about handling the details of the proposed transaction:
1. Can a warehouseman make a valid pledge of his own
warehouse receipt for fungible goods contained in his warehouse?
2. Does the Uniform Commercial Code wholly circumscribe the
relations of the parties to the transaction or are there state and federal
laws with substantive bearing?
3. If there is a default in the loan and it results in insufficient
goods in the warehouse to cover all receipts outstanding in the hands
3. An exception is BRAUCHER, parts of which are concerned with this topic.
4. The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act [hereinafter cited as U.W.R.A.] was recommended
in 1906 and eventually enacted in all jurisdictions. See S. VILLISTON, SALES § 406a (rev. ed.
1948) [hereinifter cited as WILLISTON].
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of depositors, holders and other lenders, who will share in remaining
goods and in what proportion?
4. Is it necessary to verify the authority of the agent or
employee who signs the warehouse receipts which are to be pledged?
5. How does the bank perfect its security interest in the receipts
and goods?
6. What can be done by the bank to insure its preferred position
as a creditor in both the collateral when released to the warehouseman
for sale or shipment and the proceeds from the sale of that collateral?
The first four questions, dealt with in Part I, involve close
consideration of Article 7 of the Code and are ancillary to, but
inseparable from, the last two questions. Those two questions involve
the problem of maintaining and enforcing the bank's security interest
and will necessitate a shift in the frame of reference to Article 9 of the
Code. Perfecting a security interest and establishing a system of
control so that the banker is always assured of his position involve
considerations not necessarily peculiar to warehouse receipts. Part II
of this article consequently contains a discussion of secured
transactions broader in scope than the pledge of specific documents.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Issuance and Pledge by the Warehouseman of Receipts for
Goods He Owns
At common law, it was questionable whether a valid security
interest or chattel mortgage attached to the pledge by a
warehouseman of a receipt for his own property. Validity centered
upon the question of whether a true pledge is created by delivery of
the receipt while the underlying goods remain in the possession of the
pledgor. Jurisdictions upholding such a pledge did so on the basis that
although the pledgor had the physical custody of the pledged goods,
he held them not in his individual capacity, but as a warehouseman.-
So viewed, the delivery of the document of title is sufficient delivery of
the goods to effect a pledge. On the other hand, jurisdictions denying
5. .Sev. eg. Alabama State Bank v. Barnes, 82 Ala. 607, 2 So. 349 (1886); Cowley Nat'l
Bank v Rawlings-Dobbs Elevator Co., 96 Kan. 461, 152 P. 647 (1915); Merchant's and Mfr's.
Bank of Detroit v. Hibbard, 28 Mich. 118, 11 N.W. 834 (1882); In re St. Paul K. & C. Grain
Co.. 89 Minn 98, 94 N.W. 218 (1903); First Nat'l Bank v. Lincoln Grain Co., 116 Neb. 809,
219 N V 192 11928), Hart & Parr Co. v. Robb-Lawrence Co., 17 N.D. 257, 115 N.W. 846
(1908). VWoldson %. Davenport Mill & Elevator Co., 169 Wash. 298, 13 P.2d 468 (1932).
Vol. 1969: 1051
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the validity of such a pledge did so on analogy to the rule that a
chattel mortgage is invalid unless there is either a change of
possession of the goods or a filing or recording of the mortgage.
Thus, continued dominion over the goods by the warehouseman
invalidates the attempted pledge.'
Under the Code and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, a
warehouse receipt may be issued by any warehouseman.7 Since a
"warehouseman" is defined in the Code as a person engaged in the
business of storing goods for hire,8 it follows that a warehouseman
can issue valid receipts covering goods owned by him. Even ignoring
these express provisions, it is clear that both the Code"' and the
United States Warehouse Act" contemplate issuance of receipts for
goods which the warehouseman owns.'2 There are a few cases that
seem to reach a contrary result. Such cases, however, are
distinguishable either on the basis that the warehouseman was not
engaged in the business of storing goods for hire but was storing his
own goods under an invalid field warehouse arrangement or failed to
comply with disclosure requirements of state law. 3
Awareness of the technical requirements for the form and content
of warehouse receipts is important. Such requirements may be
imposed from three sources: the Code; other state laws; or federal
law (the United States Warehouse Act). Despite Code provisions
validating receipts which do not comply with requirements of form,
there is substantial danger that the holder of a non-complying receipt
may be frustrated by holders of other receipts or by the
warehouseman's bonding company by assertions that the document
held by the pledgee is not a warehouse receipt."
6. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 49 N.E. 592 (1898); Sexton & Abbot v.
Graham, 53 Iowa 181, 4 N.W. 1090 (1880); Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App. 352 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
See also 56 AM. JUR. § 83 (1947); 93 C.J.S. §§ 19 (b), 28 (a)(4) (1956); WILLISTON § 407(a).
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-201(1) (1962) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
8. UCC § 7-202 (2)(h).
9. BRAUCHER at 9; 2 WILLISTON § 407(a).
10. U.C.C. § 7-202(2)(h).
II. 7 U.S.C. § 260 (1964). This is the stated position of the Indianapolis area office of the
warehouse service.
12. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Washington Loan & Bank Co., 167 Ga. 354, 145 S.E. 761
(1928) (but this case expresses doubt as to what a pledgee might hold if the rights of innocent
third parties were involved).
13. Central Nat'l Bank of Matoon v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 324 F.2d 830 (7th
Cir. 1963); In re United Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1960); Interstate Banking and
Trust Co. v. Brown, 235 F. 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 242 U.S. 632 (1916) (failure to comply with
state law); In re Pine Grove Canning Co., 226 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1963).
14. The problem and effect of irregularity in issuance is fully explored in Boshkofr, supra
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/1
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Section 7-401(a) of the Code provides that the obligations imposed
by Article 7 on an issuer apply even though:
[tihe document may not comply with the requirements of this Article
or of any law or regulation regarding its issue, form or content; ....
However, this section does not seem to regulate rights between the
holder and third parties. For example, in Central National Bank of
Mattoon v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland,'5 a claim on a
warehouseman's bond was made by a creditor who had loaned money
to a licensed public grain warehouseman on the security of receipts
for goods owned by the warehouseman. The bond was conditioned on
the faithful performance of duties as an operator and the unreserved
compliance with the laws of the state. The bonding company moved
for judgment on the ground that the receipts were illegal on their face
as failing to comply with Illinois law which requires receipts for grain,
purportedly owned by warehousemen, to state that the grain belonged
to the warehouseman and was stored in a separate bin. The bond was
held not to cover the receipts in question as the receipts were illegal on
their faces.
Particularly in the Midwest, there are laws and regulations beyond
the Code regulating the warehouse business." There may even be
constitutional provisions. 7 Obviously, there is some chance of conflict
between Code requirements and these specialized rules. The Code
recognizes this, providing in section 7-103 that the Code is subject to
applicable regulatory statutes of the states and the United States.
Comment 2 to section 7-103 makes it clear that such regulatory laws
are not affected by the Code and remain paramount. In addition,
section 10-104(1) provides:
The Article on Documents of Title (Article 7) does not repeal or
modify any laws prescribing the form or contents of documents of title
or the services or facilities to be afforded by bailees, or otherwise
regulating bailees' businesses in respect not specifically dealt with
herein: but the fact that such laws are violated does not affect the
note 2, who points out that the claim that a paper is not a warehouse receipt may be based on (I)
legal defects in the character of the issuer (2) factual defects in the character of the issuer (e.g.,
that the issuer was not a warehouseman), (3) deiects in the receipt itself. lhis discussion is
limited to the third category of irregularity.
15 324 1 2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
16 'ec. eg, \RK STAT. ANN §§ 77-1201 to -1227 (1956); ILL. Riv. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 293-
326a (1967). IoAA CODE §§ 543.1-.38 (1966).
17 324 I- 2d 530 (7th Cir. 1963).
Vol. 1969:-.1051
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status of a document of title which otherwise complies with the
definition of a document of title (Section 1-201).
The definition referred to is section 1-201(15) which defines document
of title to include a warehouse receipt ". . . which in the regular course
of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the
document and the goods it covers."
The effect of section 10-104(1) seems to "legalize" otherwise
nonconforming receipts, nonconformity thereupon being deemed "...
not [to] affect the status . . ." of the receipt. Does "status" mean
standing as a valid receipt among any interested parties or only as
between the issuer and the holder as specified in section 7-103? There is
no satisfactory answer to this question."
Insofar as state and federal regulatory laws may govern issuance
and form of warehouse receipts, and inasmuch as regularity of form
and issuance may well affect the rights of a holder, inquiry as to the
validity of receipts held by a pledgee cannot stop with the Code.,' One
example of the necessary examination of state law beyond the Code is
Illinois:
No warehouseman shall issue warehouse receipts to himself or co-
mingle grain owned by him with grain stored for others unless the
license issued to him by the Department so permits.'"
It is fairly certain, despite the Code, that this provision would be
given its literal effect and that a pledgee of a warehouseman not in
compliance with Illinois law would receive nothing. This may not be
unreasonable if all are presumed to know the law since the frustrated
pledgee had constructive knowledge of irregularity and should not be
deemed worthy of sharing the remains with other more innocent
parties.
18. Professor Boshkoff reaches a similar conclusion. See Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 1375-
1377. He believes the UCC did not change state law in this respect and that continued
coexistence of specialized state laws was contemplated.
19. Boshkoff, supra note 2; Boshkoff, Documents of Title: A Comparison of the Uniform
Commercial (ode and Other Uniforni Acts, with Emphasis on Michigan Law, 59 Micri. L.
REV. 711 (1961); Strohn, Article 7-Documents of Title, 30 Mo. L. REV. 300, 319 n. 109
(1965); Trousdale, The Unijbrm Commercial Code: Article 7- Warehouse Receipts and Bills of
Lading, 50 MINN. L. REV. 463 (1966).
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 114, § 214.3(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/1
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B. The United States Warehouse A ct 2
The only federal law which merits consideration is the United
States Warehouse Act. This Act has no substantive effect on matters
considered here, although compliance with the Act should be verified
by a pledgee in view of the regularity and lawfulness of issuance of
receipts. Section 255 of the Act provides that persons depositing
products for storage in a warehouse licensed under the Act are
deemed to have deposited them subject to the terms of the Act as well
as the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The Act does not seem by this declaration to pre-empt
state law or the Code in any manner. Section 260 which provides for
the form and content of receipts issued by warehouses licensed under
the Act will have some effect on the issue of reiularitv and lawfulness.
However, Section 260 is essentially the same as section 7-202 of the
Code, particularly with respect to the contents of receipts issued by a
warehouseman for his own goods. The form of a federal receipt is
standardized by regulation so deviation from the Code is easily
noticeable.
It is arguable that federal regulation of warehouse receipts has pre-
empted the field. Therefore, in the absence of substantive provisions in
the Act governing such matters as overissue, the common law will
prevail. However, this is contrary to general principles of federal pre-
emption since there is no intent inherent in the federal Act to pre-
empt the Code or state law on matters of substance except those
expressly covered in the Act. 22 For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corporation," the question was whether the United States
Warehouse Act had superseded the authority of the Illinois Commerce
21. United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-73 (1964).
22. As to pre-emption, compare the pre-emption imposed by the Federal Bills of Lading Act
(Pomerene Act) 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124; Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
49 U.S C. 20 (1964). Both are discussed in 2 WILLISTON § 406a.
23. 331 U S 218 (1946). There is a suggestion in this case that if state law in any way
retricts or qualifies the warehouseman's ability to issue receipts, state law is pre-empted and
inapplicable The context in which this suggestion is made makes clear that one reason
pre-eniption was thought necessary was to endow receipts of the federal licensees with full value
for collateral purposes. Id. at 233 n. II.
The Illinois Department of Agriculture takes the position that Illinois law should be observed
by federally licensed warehouses, E.g., "I would take the position that, regardless of a federal
license, where an Illinois license does not allow commingling of grain owned by the
warehouseman, the grain of an outside customer should have preference over the grain stored by
the warehouseman in his own behalf." Letter from Maurice W. Coburn, technical advisor, State
of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, to the author, June 3, 1969.
Vol. 1969: 1051
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Commission to regulate storage rates, issuance of securities,
abandonment of service, operating without a state license and mixing
grain with grains of different grades. All were accomplished by the
movant-warehouse in violation of Illinois law. The warehouse
company sought to enjoin further proceedings by the Illinois
Commerce Commission for redress of practices contrary to Illinois
law. Considering the dichotomy of federal and state regulations, the
court reviewed the history of the United States Warehouse Act
noticing that as originally enacted in 1916, the Act was subservient to
state regulation. However, the court noted that by the 1931
amendment to the Act, Congress made the Act independent of state
legislation. Based on the legislative history, the court held that the test
in finding pre-emption on any matter is ". . . whether the matter on
which the State asserts the right to act is any way regulated by the
Federal Act." 4 The court declared that where the Act contained no
provision expressly relating to matters of state 'interest, state action
was not foreclosed.
One confusing aspect of this holding is that federally licensed
warehouses need not procure state licenses. If a state licensing law,
such as that of Illinois, prohibits issuance of receipts for the
warehouseman's own commingled grain without permission, it is
arguable that state interest has not been foreclosed but that the
interest cannot be observed because of its means of expression, that is,
through state licensing.
Reference is also made to section 7-103 of the Code providing that
the provisions of the Code are subject to statutes of the United States
to the extent that such statutes are applicable. Conversely, if a federal
statute is inapplicable, the Code will apply.
Section 268 of the Act provides that the Secretary of Agriculture
may make rules and regulations necessary for efficient execution of its
provisions. The question which might arise is whether rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary would interfere, conflict
with or supersede substantive provisions of the Code previously
discussed? This is doubtful because the regulatory power of the
Secretary is limited by the statutory delegation of authority. The
statutory delegation of Section 268 would not include authority to
promulgate rules and regulations affecting substantive rights beyond
those expressly regulated by the Act.'
24. 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1946).
25. See generally K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 5.03 at 299, 5.04 at 308 (1958).
[Vol. 1969: 105
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The commercial lender should consider, when choosing
warehouseman customers, that since the enactment of the United
States Warehouse Act, there has been no instance where any depositor
loss was suffered as the result of failure of a federally licensed
warehouse. Although there have been shortages upon failure of
federally licensed warehouses, existing supplies and bond proceeds
have been sufficient to pay liabilities of the federally licensed
warehouse to depositors."' The fact that 85 to 90 per cent of public
grain storage in the United States is in federally licensed facilities or
operated under agreement with the Commodity Credit Corporation27
probably accounts for the dearth of litigation concerning warehouse
receipts.
The commercial lender should also note two specific aspects of
federal licensing: the benefits of registration of receipts under the Act
and the constant surveillance imposed upon licensees by the Act. 2 By
arrangement, the Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service
branch of the Department of Agriculture may appoint a registrar of
receipts for licensed elevators operating in any "terminal market".29
The appointment is not mandatory. Upon election to use the registrar,
all receipt forms of an elevator are overprinted "Not valid until
registered by U.S. Registrar." Changes in ownership are to be
reported to the Registrar. The Registrar has supervisory duties, many
of which would provide the same types of assurance and protection as
a true field warehousing program?"
C. Relative Rights in the Event of Overissue
I. The (ode Provisions
This section considers the relative rights of holders of warehouse
receipts, both depositors and pledgees, when it becomes apparent that
there are insufficient goods in the warehouse to cover outstanding
receipts due to the warehouseman's insolvency. Although the Code
purports to codify and simplify previous law, the following discussion
26. Letter from John C. Blum, deputy administrator, regulatory programs, consumer and
marketing service, United States Department of Agriculture, to the author, Sept. 4, 1968.
27. Id Licensing means constant surveillance and surprise inspection by federal authorities.
28. See generalh 7 C.F.R. § 102 et. seq. (1968).
29. Id at § 102 105. The designation "'terminal market" is established by the Administrator.
Appointment ot a registrar automatically makes the market a "terminal market."
30. Id at§ 102.110(1969).
Vol. 1969: 1051
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indicates that scant attention was given by the draftsmen to the rights
of a pledgee in the event of overissue.
Overissue occurs in various ways. If a warehouseman is dishonest,
there is danger in taking his own receipt for goods which he represents
he owns. Furthermore, the defalcating warehouseman, if he is also in
the business of selling goods, can sell these articles covered by
outstanding receipts thereby eliminating the rights of the holders of
the receipts under section 7-205.
Overissue also may occur in more sophisticated dress. There is a
general rule that when there is an overall shortage in the mass in a
warehouse, the warehouseman's goods are appropriated by operation
of law to the extent necessary to make up the deficiency of other
depositors.3' Under this "appropriation doctrine," a shortage of
goods under the warehouseman's own receipts may result although
other depositors have no shortage.
Section 7-402 states the general Code rule respecting rights of
parties in the event of a shortage of goods:
Neither a duplicate nor any other document of title purporting to
cover, goods already represented by an outstanding document of the
same issuer confers any right in the goods, except as provided in the
case of bills in a set, overissue of documents for fungible goods and
substitutes for lost, stolen or destroyed documents. But the issuer is
liable for damages caused by his overissue or failure to identify a
duplicate document as such by conspicuous notation on its face.
Under this section, where two or more documents are issued
covering the same goods, the first to become outstanding is the
original and all others are duplicates. The holder of the original, or
the first to become outstanding, 'is the person entitled to the goods.
Other holders are relegated to an action for damages against the
warehouseman 32
However, this section recognizes an express exception to the general
rule in the case of fungible goods. Rights of certain holders in the
event of overissue with respect to fungible goods are extended by
section 7-207(2):
Fungible goods so commingled are owned in common by the persons
entitled thereto and the warehouseman is severally liable to each owner
31. See text accompanying notes 50-57, injra.
32. I W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UCC § 1.7001 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as HAWKLAND].
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/1
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for that owner's share. Where because of overissue a mass of fungible
goods is insufficient to meet all the receipts which the warehouseman
has issued against it, the persons entitled include all holders to whom
overissued receipts have been duly negotiated.
This creates a second and special class of persons entitled to share
in the mass of fungible goods remaining in the event of overissue. The
"person entitled" include all persons to whom overissued receipts
have been "duly negotiated." In the event of an overissue, it is
necessary to consider both section 7-402 and section 7-207(2) to
determine who can share. If there is an overissue and if the "persons
entitled" cannot satisfy their claims from the remaining goods, they
will turn to the warehouseman's bond. It is conceivable that the
"persons entitled" will exhaust the warehouseman's bond. When this
occurs, others who might have a claim will be relegated to the status
of a general creditor.
In order to determine who can share, two classes of persons must
be identified: first, those specified by section 7-402, and second, the
special class created by section 7-207(2), those "... to whom over-
issued receipts have been duly negotiated."
The first class is more easily determined. It consists simply of
persons who would be entitled to the goods whether or not there was
an overissue. This class will be comprised, under section 7-402, of
those persons whose receipts actually represent deposits. Anyone else
will be holding either a duplicate or other document of title
purporting to cover goods already represented by an outstanding
document and will be precluded under section 7-402.
The second and special class of "duly negotiated holders" created
by section 7-207(2) may include persons who are entitled to share with
actual depositors even though their receipts may not represent
deposits. Under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, if competing
claimants can show that a particular receipt did not represent a
deposit, the holder is precluded from sharing. This is still true with
respect to duplicate non-negotiable receipts or other receipts
".. .purporting to cover goods already represented by an outstanding
document . . ," under section 7-402. However, the holder of a negoti-
able receipt now has a preferred position and can share with the actual
depositors if he fits within the class of "duly negotiated holders"
specified by section 7-207. ' The comment to section 7-207 states:
33. U.C C 7-207, comment; U.W.R.A. §§ 22, 23; 1 HAWKLAND § 1.700402.
34 I HAWKLAND § 1.700402.
Vol. 1969: 1051
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Where individual ownership interests are merged into claims on a
common fund, as is necessarily the case with fungible goods, there is no
policy reason for discriminating between successive purchasers o1'
similar claims.
The Code seems to say that if a pledgee bank can fit within the
case designated by section 7-207, the bank should be allowed to share
pro rata with persons who have actually made deposits.
This may be fair in principle, but it is questioned whether the Code
intends this result if the warehouseman never had goods in the
warehouse and had simply issued fradulent receipts. It appears that
the Code does not compel actual depositors to share with the bank in
such case because there were never any goods to which the bank's lien
could attach. However, suppose the warehouseman had sufficient
goods on hand at the time of issuance to the pledgee bank but
subsequently sells his goods or creates shortages in the goods of other
depositors. The status of the pledgee bank versus that of the
depositors in such an instance is not clear under the Code.
2. What The Code Purports To Do
The case which section 7-207(2) purports to overrule is Curacao
Trading Company v. Federal Insurance Conipany15 That case actually
held that the holder of spurious warehouse receipts had no claim under
an insurance policy which protected the holder of the receipts against
nondelivery by virtue of Fire and similar events.
More nearly applicable to the question involved is In re Harbor
Stores Corporation3 1 which arose out of the bankruptcy which generated
Curacao Trading. The bankrupt warehouse had stored cocoa
beans and issued more receipts than there were beans on hand to
cover. Twenty-four claims for the remaining beans were filed. The
referee allowed nineteen on a pro rata basis. An unsuccessful claimant
who was the holder of negotiable receipts appealed. At the time the
receipts had been issued to this party, there were no beans in the
warehouse to cover. All existing beans were owned by other
depositors. The court affirmed disallowance of the claim on the basis
that the claimant's receipt was a mere duplicate and a complete
nullity3 7
35. 137 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 765 (1944); BRtAUCHER at 96-97: I
HAWKLAND § 1.700402.
36. 29 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
37. It may be questionable whether this case dealt with fungibles at all as the court says:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/1
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Inasmuch as the claimant in In re Harbor Stores was a pledgee
and the holder of negotiable receipts, the case seems to present
facts "hich would be affected by section 7-207(2). However, the court
did not appear to think that fungibles were involved. Assuming that
fungibles were involved, and assuming that the Code does aim to
affect a situation such as this, the intent of the Code as seen by the
commentators is to allow the claimant in the In re Harbor Stores
situation to share pro rata. The following discussion questions whether
the courts w ill enforce such a result?'
To determine which holders qualify as "... holders to whom over-
issued receipts have been duly negotiated. .. " under section 7-207(2),
it is necessary to define "holders" and "duly negotiated." If a pledgee
bank cannot be both a "holder" and one to whom overissued receipts
have been "duly negotiated," it cannot be among this special class.
"Holder" is defined in section 1-201(20) as "... a person who is in
possession of a document of title or an instrument or an investment
security draxwn, issued or endorsed to him or to his order or to bearer
or in blank." A bank clearly can fit within this class.
Perhaps there is more difficulty under the second restriction which
is one of' 'due negotiation." The question is whether taking a receipt
from the wvarehouseman as pledgee is equivalent to negotiation.
Section 7-501 prescribes the requirement of "due negotiation":
(1) \ negotiable document of title running to the order of a named
person 5 negotiated by his endorsement and delivery. After his
endorsement in blank or to bearer any person can negotiate it by
delivery alone.
(2) (a) A negotiable document of title is also negotiated by
deliverN alone when by its original terms it runs to bearer.
(b) When a documeni running to the order of a named person
is deliered to him the effect is the same as if the document had been
negotiated ....
f4) \ negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated" when it is
negotiated in the manner stated in this section to a holder who
purchases it in good faith without notice of any defense against or
"The aes inoiine fungibles. have no application, as there was no commingling here of the
bags of the diiercn clanimant-.. \sither is there any basis for an estoppel against the real owner
of the propert, - Id it 751.
38 It lungihie. %\ere not involved in In re Harbor Stores, then fungibles were not
invoked in ( uracao Trading because the same bags of cocoa should have maintained their
legal character The commentators may have picked on an inept example for the Code to
overrule unless the bags xkere assumed to be fungible for purposes of illustration.
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claim to it on the part of any person and for value unless it is
established that the negotiation is not in the regular course of business
or financing or involves receiving the document in settlement or
payment of a money obligation.
Under section 7-501, a pledgee bank takes by due negotiation if it
purchases the document in good faith for value in the regular course
of financing without notice of any defense against or claim to the
document on the part of any other person. There is no question that a
pledgee is a "purchaser" as that term is defined in sections 1-
201(32) and 1-201(33). The language of subsection 4 of section 7-501
and comment 1 to section 7-501 clearly contemplates the concept of due
negotiation being operative in the case of a pledgee or other transferee
"in the regular course of business or financing". A pledgee also can
easily meet the requirements of taking in good faith, without notice of
any defense or claim and for value.3 9
3. Defeat of The "Duly Negotiated Holders"
a. General principles. Even if a pledgee bank is among the special
class of holders ". . . to whom overissued receipts have been duly
negotiated . . ." under section 7-207(2), its rights are subject to
curtailment under instances specified in section 7-502. That section,
in specifying the rights in the goods acquired by due negotiation,
recognizes that even the otherwise preferred position of the "duly
negotiated holder" may be upset under the exceptions imposed by
sections 7-205 and 7-503:
(1) Where there has been a sale of the goods in the ordinary course
of business by a warehouseman who is also in the business of buying
and selling.0
(2) Where the bailment generating the document was unauthorized
(as where a thief takes and stores goods and negotiates the document
received).4'
(3) Where the document is issued by a forger.42
(4) Where there are no goods existing upon which to issue a
receipt.43
39. See BRAUCHER 53-60; i HAWKLAND § 1.6903, at 349-53.
40. U.C.C. § 7-205.
41. U.C.C. § 7-503(I)(a). No chain of title deriving from dealing with goods can prevail over
title based on a negotiable document which is validly issued, but invalidity of issue is fatal to a
claim based on the document. I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 24.1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILIORE]; I HAWKLAND § 1.6903, at 354.
42. BRAUCHER at 61; 2 WILLISTON § 443.
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These exceptions seem logical enough initially. However, the
exception indicated in paragraph 2 may give rise to some difficulty if
the distinction between stolen goods and stolen documents is not
recognized. If goods are stolen, deposited in a warehouse in exchange
for a negotiable receipt and the receipt negotiated, there is an
unauthorized bailment and the document confers no title. On the
other hand, if the document itself is stolen and negotiated, the duly
negotiated holder is accorded full rights." This distinction, as well as
the above exceptions, is aligned with the general Code purpose of
providing greater facility and reliability to the use of negotiable paper.
Yet the Code also recognizes that the concept of negotiability and the
underlying title to goods conferred, although entitled to great
consideration, cannot prevail to grant title when there was never any
title to grant. The maximum protection that the Code gives the "duly
negotiated holder" extends only to making the holder's claim not
subject to defeat by stoppage, surrender of the goods by the bailee,
negotiation in breach of duty, negotiation of a lost or stolen document
and previous sale of the document or goods to a third person without
delivery or other than in the ordinary course of business.4 5 It is
incorrect, therefore, to say that in all cases the "duly negotiated
holder" shares in goods on hand. It is clearly competent under the
Code to show, in defeat of the duly negotiated holder's claim, any of
these exceptions.
b. The anoinaly of nonexistent goods. The most difficult exception
and that which apparently conflicts with the express rights granted
duly negotiated holders under section 7-207, is the fourth noted
above. All commentators seem to assume that ". . . even due
negotiation cannot create a bailee or goods where none exist .... ""
But insofar as section 7-207 seems to allow persons to whom receipts
have been duly negotiated to share pro rata even if such persons did
not make any deposits, there seems to be a serious anomaly in the
Code.
As stated above, the Code seeks to overrule Curacao Trading.
Assuming that the commentators have chosen that case as an example
43 BRALCHER at 61; 2 WILLISTON § 417.
44. U C .C § 7-503. comment I; 2 GILMORE § 25.4. Compare the opposite result under the
original version of the UW.R.A. in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Leflore Bank &
Trust Co , 254 Miss. 598, 181 So. 2d 913 (1966).
45 U C C. §§ 7-205, 7-502(2); 2 GILMORE § 25.4; 2 WILLISTON § 427.
46 BRALCHER at 61.
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of the rights the Code would realign, it is clear that, contrary to
exception four above, the Code allows a warehouseman to create
rights in a pledgee who otherwise qualifies as a "duly negotiated
holder" even though the warehouseman had no goods at the time of
pledge.
Assume that a warehouseman pledges receipts for his own goods.
Further assume that at the time he makes a pledge, he had no goods
of his own to cover pledged receipts. If the warehouseman's receipts
are duly negotiated, is the holder allowed to share pro rata under
Section 7-207(2) or is this receipt a nullity under the exception above
because there were no goods to support the receipt? If the pledgee is
allowed to share pro rata, the warehouseman, in effect, granted the
pledgee rights in goods belonging to others. The warehouseman is
little better than a thief. A thief cannot, through unauthorized
bailment, create any rights in the "duly negotiated holder" by
procuring a negotiable receipt. Under prior law, no interest was
conferred in a pledgee by a warehouseman who had no goods at the
time of pledge. 7 A contrary result would be ridiculous but if the Code
actually seeks to overrule Curacao Trading, the result is dictated.
c. The doctrine of appropriation. The problem becomes more
complex. Assume that the warehouseman pledges receipts for his own
goods. Further assume that at the time the warehouseman makes the
pledge, he had no goods of his own but later acquired some to "feed"
the receipt. If no other depositor had any shortage, the pledge is valid
under Section 7-502(1)(c)? s
Now assume that at the time the warehouseman makes the pledge,
he had goods of his own but in a minuscule amount and wholly
insufficient to cover his outstanding receipts. Here, the duly negotiated
holder can state that even if he takes no rights where there are no
goods, there are currently goods on hand and he should, therefore,
share pro rata. This instance seems to present the same problems as
where there is a complete absence of goods.
Now assume that at the time the warehouseman makes the pledge,
he had goods of his own but there was a shortage as to other
depositors in the warehouse. Or, alternatively, assume that the
shortage occurred subsequent to the pledge. Here the doctrine of
appropriation for the benefit of other depositors must be met. The
Code does not deal with this problem49
47. 56 AmI. JUR. Warehouse §§ 79, 167 (1947), and cases cited therein.
48. See U.C.C. § 7-502, comment I.
49. See BRAUCHER at 101.
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There is a general rule that if there is a shortage and the
warehouseman has goods of his own in the warehouse, or adds goods
of his own, the warehouseman's own goods are appropriated for the
benefit of other depositors to the extent necessary to make them
whole."' Professor Braucher believes that if the doctrine of
appropriation is applied to the prejudice of the warehouseman's
creditors an unfair result is achieved." However, where the rights of
actual depositors, who may be small farmers, are asserted against the
rights of a bank financing a dishonest warehouseman, it is likely that
the farmers will win. 2 This is so particularly since the Code does not
provide otherwise and the doctrine of appropriation is generally
accepted." The rule of appropriation announced in Hall v. Pillsbury,.4
considered the leading case, is:
But. while the interest of the depositor in the mass is measured by
what he deposits . . . the interest of the warehouseman, by reason of
putting his own grain in the mass, is not necessarily measured by what
he puts in; for it, from any cause for which he is responsible, as by his
taking grain outfrom [sic] the mass, the whole amount is diminished
below what is required to fill the outstanding receipts, what he puts in
is appropriated at once, so far as may be necessary, to the receipts, and
becomes at once the property of the holders.
The seriousness of the appropriation doctrine is seen when the
courts view the proceeds of the warehouseman's bond as the substitute
for goods when a shortage is discovered. Depositors, consequently,
may have the right not only to exhaust the remaining goods, but also
to appropriate bond proceeds in satisfaction of their receipts prior to
the hapless bank-pledgee asserting his claims. In such event, the
holder of a receipt which never represented any goods or from which
the underlying goods were appropriated might be considered a junior
lienor who has a secured position secondary only to that of the
holders of receipts which represented goods when issued. This is fair
.0 S6 \Ni JLR Warehouse§ 168 (1947).
51. BRiLCHiR at 101.
52 See intra pp. 30-35 for cases which seem to favor the innocent third party.
53 1,ee. e g, United States v. Luther, 225 F.2d 499, 508-09 (10th Cir. 1955); Central States
Corp % Luther, 215 I-.2d 38, 45-46 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v. Haddix & Sons, Inc., 268
F Supp 825. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1967); United States v. United Marketing Ass'n 220 F. Supp.
299, 305 iN D Iowa 1963).
S4. 43 Minn 33, 36, 44 N.W. 673, 674 (1890).
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and gives such a holder priority in sharing any remainder of goods,
bond proceeds or other assets of the insolvent warehouse. This
analogy has been made.55 Assuming the goods are gone, satisfaction
comes primarily from bond proceeds, but only after other depositors
are paid leaving him in the position of an unsecured creditor claiming
out of the general assets of the insolvent warehouseman's estate." If
such a junior lienor can trace the proceeds of his loan, he might be
able to assert some form of equitable lien, but such tracing is difficult
of proof.57
d. Discerning. a result by extrapolation-prior case law. Only one
case seems to support the theory of sharing which the Code appears
to promote. It is doubtful whether that case was well considered or is
applicable since the issue was not directly considered. Several other
cases, none of which were decided under the Code, seem to reach a
result opposite from the Code upon a better reasoning.
McDonnell v. Bank of China,5 8 is the only case which seems to
reach the Code result and Professor Braucher agrees that it is the
right result.59 There, Trader deposited flour in Warehouse as collateral
security for the payment of a loan from Warehouse to Trader. It is
not clear whether Warehouse issued Trader receipts and took a
pledge, or whether the goods were held as a pledge. Warehouse, in
turn, discounted Trader's note to Bank and issued a receipt to Bank
which stated "we have received the goods mentioned in this
instrument and will hold them to (your order)." On the subsequent
insolvency of both Trader and Warehouse, it was discovered that
there were insufficient goods to cover outstanding receipts, including
those held by Bank. Bank sought to assert its pro rata interest in the
remaining goods. The other claimants argued that no rights were
conferred upon Bank. The court held that Bank was entitled to share
on an equal footing, stating:
As long as the Warehouse Company held the note of the Trading
55. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Roxbury Distilling Co., 196 F. 76, 96, 102 (D. Md. 1912).
56. 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.18(6) (14th ed. 1968).
57. 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.25(2) (14th" ed. 1968). Difficulties in such tracing are
exemplified by the case of Central States Corp., v. Luther, 215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955).
58. 33 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 612 (1930).
59. BRAUCHER at 100.
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Corporation, it will be conceded that it (the Warehouse Company)
could assert no right as pledgee in any of the flour in storage as against
the holders of warehouse receipts, where there was not sufficient flour
in storage to meet the demands of all.
But when the Warehouse Company attorned or transferred its right in
the pledged property to the appellant, a different situation arose. For
while prior to the transfer the Warehouse Company held the pledged
property in its own right, after the transfer it held as agent or bailee for
the transfer it held as agent or bailee for the transferee. It may be con-
ceeded that the relations existing between the Warehouse Company and
the holders of outstanding warehouse receipts were somewhat different
from the relation existing between the Warehouse Company and the
appellant, but in the absence of some statute giving a priority of right
to the holders of warehouse receipts, we are of the opinion that the
several claimants stand on an equal footing in a court of equityY'
Analyzing this case, it is possible to say that the flour in question
which had been pledged to the bank was, in effect, owned by
Warehouse. This is because Trader also was insolvent and whatever
rights Trader had in the flour accrued to Warehouse as Trader's
pledgee. If Warehouse owned the flour, it may seem that under the
appropriation doctrine, Warehouse's flour would be applied to
shortage of other depositors in derogation of the Bank's rights.
However, this was not done, and Professor Braucher argues that this
is the correct result under the Code, assuming Bank took a negotiable
receipt. Professor Braucher further points out that if Bank did not
take a negotiable receipt, it could have only the right Warehouse had
under section 7-402.6
The McDonnell case has never been cited. It was criticized" on the
basis that if there was not enough flour to cover at the time of the
pledge from Warehouse to Bank, the Bank should not be able to take
as a tenant in common because of the rule in Hall v. Pillsbury. The
critic further remarks that the court ignored the necessity of proof by
the Bank that there was any flour sufficient to cover at the time of the
pledge by Warehouse to Bank. According to many authorities,
including Professor Braucher, the Code seeks to overrule the Curacao
60 33 I 2d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1929) (citations omitted).
61 BRAUCtiLR at 100.
62 Note. 39 YALE L J 432 (1930).
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Trading case. Again, it seems that despite the authorities stating
that no rights can be created in a pledgee where no goods exist, the
intent of the Code rejects that position.
4. Speculation-How Will the Courts Treat the Code?
Several more recent cases reach a result contrary to that of the
McDonnell case and more in line with that of Curacao Trading.
None of these were decided under the Code but they are mentioned
here as an indication of prior authorities the Code will have to
overcome if the curious result dictated by its plain language will
pertain.
In Central States Corporation v. Luther,13 a claimant sought judg-
ment against the trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent warehouseman
for the possession of grains and funds in possession of the trustee. Prior
to bankruptcy, claimant had purchased and paid for milo which was
supposed to be owned by the bankrupt warehouseman. As evidence of
the purchases, claimant received the warehouseman's receipts for the
milo. Each receipt was designated as negotiable and contained a
statement that the bankrupt had received a specified number of
bushels of milo "in store" for the claimant. Noting Kansas statutory
requirements for receipts issued by a warehouseman, particularly a
provision that receipts of a warehouseman were unlawful unless grain
had been deposited and under the warehouseman's control, the court
found that issuance and delivery of the receipts held by claimant did
not conform to the statute. Since these receipts were not validly
issued, claimant was not permitted to use his receipts as a basis for an
assertion of any right to grain in the warehouse upon the bankrupt's
insolvency."
Prior to the warehouseman's insolvency, claimant asked for and
received from the warehouseman several deliveries of the milo
claimant purchased. The trustee in bankruptcy sought reclamation of
the milo arguing that the deliveries were a preference. Claimant
argued that he was able to trace his money to the commingled fund of
milo which came into the trustee's hands and that an equitable lien or
63. 215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955).
64. This points up the necessity for strict compliance with state law as to form and regularity
in issuance of receipts.
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constructive trust upon the milo had been established, This, he urged,
should entitle him to enforce his warehouse receipts pro rata by
retaining the milo which had been delivered to him prior to the
bankruptcy. Not only did the court deny claimant a pro rata share of
milo, but the court also forced claimant to return all of the milo. The
court stated:
It is the xell established rule of law in Kansas and elsewhere that
, here o~kners of grain deposit it N ith a warehouseman for storage...
the relationship among the several depositors is that of tenants in
common of the commingled mass . . . and the right of the
%arehouseman to sell or make other disposition from a common mass
1s limited to the excess thereof over and above the quantity necessary to
redeei the receipt for other commitments issued to the
depositors . . . The referee found as a fact that the bankrupt
delivered to the claimant milo in the amount of 876,191 pounds when it
did not have in the common mass any excess over and above the
amount required to discharge his obligations to the depositors of milo.
Therefore. the delivery to the claimant of that grain amounted to a
transfer from the common mass which did not belong to the bankrupt
but to the depositors thereof as tenants in common6
The result is much like the holding of Hall v. Pillsbury. Although
the court made the above statement in the context of avoiding a sale
from the bankrupt warehouseman to the claimant, it seems that the
same reasoning governs a pledge and relegates a pledgee to a junior
position %khere the warehouseman does not have sufficient goods of
his ossn on hand to cover at the time of pledge.
Gould v. City Bank & Trust Companyi involved priorities between
holders of negotiable receipts. Issuer's negotiable receipt for whiskey
was pledged for a loan. When the loan was paid, the receipt was not
returned. Subsequently, issuer procured another loan pledging other
negotiable receipts respecting the same goods. In turn, the first
pledgee transferred the receipts which were never returned when the
first loan was paid. The holder of the receipts which were first issued
was determined to have full right in the goods while the subsequently
issued receipts conferred no rights. The court stated:
65 215 I- 2d 3X, 45-47 (10th Cir. 1954). (err, denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955),
6() 213 I 2d 314 4th Cir. 1954).
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That warehouse receipts first issued and outstanding since date of
issuance have priority of right over those subsequently issued on the
same property is, of course, well settled.17
There is no dispute that this is the correct rule under section 7-402
if the underlying goods are not fungible. The court does not consider
whether or not the whiskey was fungible. It cites, as authority for its
holding, Curacao Trading and Merchants National Bank of
Baltimore v. Roxbury Distilling Company," where the court apparently
treated whiskey as a fungible. It was previously remarked that the
court in In re Harbor Stores Corporation, which arose from the same
bankruptcy as Curacao Trading, considered the bags of cocoa
beans nonfungible. In view of this confusion, the import of Gould v.
City Bank & Trust is questioned.
In United States v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Company,8 Benson-
Quinn purchased soybeans from a Warehouse, Upon Warehouse's
insolvency, there were not enough goods to cover outstanding receipts.
The goods on hand and the proceeds of the bond together were
insufficient to satisfy all of the claims. Some claimants contested the
allowance of Benson-Quinn's claim on the grounds that there was a
shortage of goods at the time of Benson-Quinn's purchase. Therefore,
since the rights of other innocent parties were involved, Benson-Quinn
should not have been able to assert any claim until all other claimants
were satisfied. The court held for Benson-Quinn, allowing them to
share. The court distinguished the first Luther case on three grounds:
(1) that claimant there held invalid receipts; (2) that claimant there
knew there was no milo in the warehouse when it received deliveries;
and (3) that claimant there was unable to trace his money to grain in
the warehouse. The court also distinguished the Central National Bank
of Mattoon case on the ground that in that situation it definitely could
be said that there was no grain in the warehouse at the time receipts
were issued to the claimant. In view of the distinctions made in
Merchants Mutual Bonding Company, some support may be found
for the Code rule, at least where competing claimants cannot show a
complete absence of grain owned by the warehouseman.
In Merchants Mutual Bonding Company, the argument that where
the rights of other innocent parties are involved, the claim of the
67. Id. at 316.
68. See text accompanying note 87 infta.
69. 242 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
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holder of the warehouseman's own receipt should not share was
refused. However, favoring the rights of innocent parties was
prominent in at least one decision. In Fidelity State Bank v. Central
Security and Insurance Corporation a surety company sought to
avoid liability on its bond on the grounds that warehouse receipts
taken by a bank as security and purporting to cover goods owned by
the warehouseman did not comply with state law. In denying recovery
to the bank, the court stated:
If transactions like those in this case are upheld, the holders of invalid
receipts may make a claim against the bondsman of the warehouseman,
and the protection sought to be given those who store grain in
warehouses or who purchase valid warehouse receipts, could be
destroyed,"
Finally, United States v. Haddix & Sons, Incorporated2 must be
considered. It is an instructive decision touching closely upon, if not
fully disposing of, the present speculation. This case was the ". . . third
installment in another story of a warehouseman who could not resist
the temptation to sell what he should have been storing."7" The
competing claimants were Commolity Credit Corporation (CCC) and
the National Bank of Detroit (Bank).
CCC stored corn in the Haddix warehouse. Haddix did not have
sufficient supplies to meet outstanding receipts, most of which were
held by CCC. Neither CCC nor the Bank was aware of this. Haddix
found itself in a position where it could make sales to Ralston-Purina
at $1.23 , per bushel. At the time, the price Haddix paid CCC for
the corn was almost $1.16 per bushel. Haddix could turn a quick
profit if it raised the money to purchase from CCC. Haddix
approached the Bank, which had no more reason than CCC to know
of Haddix' condition, for a loan. It was arranged that the Bank
would loan to Haddix on a demand basis, the loan to be secured by a
chattel mortgage on the corn. In effect, it was a purchase money
mortgage. The deal was consummated and the proceeds of the loan
used to pay CCC.
Eventually, the fact of Haddix' insolvency and shortages came to
70. 228 I- 2d 654 (10th Cir. 1955). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Washington Loan &
knking Co, 161 Ga. 354, 145 S.E. 761 (1928) (dictum indicating that the warehouseman's
pledge should not, perhaps, be upheld where innocent parties are involved).
71 228 1- 2d at 657, '
72. 268 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
73. Id at 827.
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light. Haddix was placed in receivership and the corn in storage was
transferred to CCC by the receiver upon the government's promise to
indemnify persons later shown to have an interest in the mass. The
Bank then asserted its rights under its security arrangement with
Haddix.
The government's position was simply that a shortage existed at the
time of the purchase from CCC. Therefore, under the doctrine of
appropriation, when Haddix purchased from CCC, CCC's right
immediately became choate and attached to the corn Haddix
purchased thereby appropriating Haddix' corn to make up the
shortage and defeating the rights of the Bank under its chattel
mortgage. The court said:
[The government's position] ... rests upon dicta in Pillsburr that a
warehouseman who does not have sufficient produce on hand to meet
his bailment obligations and adds his own to the mass immediately
loses title to so much of the newly introduced amount as would be
necessary to redeem outstanding receipts were they then submitted for
satisfaction.71
Nevertheless, the court awarded the Bank its share and sustained its
chattel mortgage on the grounds that it was a purchase money chattel
mortgage and, as such, under Michigan law and the law generally,
was entitled to precedence under Michigan law and the general law."
The court correctly justifies its result by reasoning that the purchase
money mortgagee, although a mortgagee in the legal sense, is in many
respects the true buyer for he: (1) supplies the money which causes the
vendor to transfer title: (2) has more ecuitv in the subject matter than
the nominal buyer; and (3) relies primarily on the vendor's title in
extending credit75
Although it is unfair to read conclusions by negative implication
into this case, particularly since it was a pre-Code case, it is fair to
observe that had the Bank been other than a purchase money
mortgagee or had it held other than a purchase money security
interest, it might, under this analysis have been left remediless. This is
particularly clear when one recognizes the thrust of the court's
statement that "Commodity is no better off than a non-purchase
money mortgagee who relies on a standard after-acquired property
clause."' 77 If that was CCC's actual position, it is clear that it would
74. Id. at 834.
75. This is also true under the Code if the procedures of section 9-312(3) are followed.
76. 268 F. Supp. 825, 835 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
77. Id. at 836.
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have had priority over the Bank if the Bank had not been a purchase
money mortgagor.75
In summary, the Code seems to reach a somewhat novel result by
favoring holders to whom receipts for fungible goods have been duly
negotiated. Possibly, the Code goes even further and grants this
preferred class some rights in a remaining mass and in the proceeds of
the "arehouseman's bond. This is true even where there are never any
goods to support issuance of the holder's receipts.7 9 Code
commentators agree that no right can be created where no goods
exist. On the other hand, the commentators state that the Code seeks
to change the rule of Curacao Trading and import the rule of
Mcl)onnell v. Bank ol China. These two statements are wholly
contradictory. This convolution aside, the Code completely ignores
relative rights Nhere the doctrine of appropriation is involved. Code
commentators feel that the doctrine of appropriation should not
operate to defeat creditors of the warehouseman. On the other hand,
what prior law there is seems to favor actual depositors over such
creditors.
Certainly. no harm devolves from a pledgee taking a negotiable
receipt. Since there is at least a likelihood under the Code that a duly
negotiated holder will gain a preferred position, the mere possibility is
enough to dictate the prudent business man insisting upon negotiable
receipts."' The conjectural additional protection given by such
7K 'Since thi case involhed a national bank, it is appropriate to observe that the Federal
Reserse Board Lonsiders chattel mortgages dissimiiar to sarehouse receipts locking title into the
document and ma.y :onsider all xarehouse receipts issued by the warehouseman for his own
goods ineligible ior rediscount, Nce 1918 ii) Rrs BUL.i 309, 437, 871. Moreover, one might
obscrsc the problem ol national bank lending limitations imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964).
The IY, irmitation, na. he e\ccpted to under 12 U.S.C. § 84(6) (1964). if the loan is secured
by warehouse receipts oi the borroxscr but only where the receipts are registered with an
independent registrar, Ei io Bk L Si R x 678.16(5). Had there been an independent registrar
here, Haddix might have been kept under control and the day of reckoning avoided.
As a practical matter, the que tion ot qualification for discount is not a problem as, with the
exception of couon in the Memphis I ederal Reserve District, there considered a fungible,
Federal Reserse Banks even in terminal markets rarely if ever discount loans secured by
warehouse receipts. The existence of the Aarchouseman's own receipts as collateral in a member
bank's portfolio, if othersise satisfactory, will not be criticized by examiners. Interview with F.
Garland Russell, Jr., Esq., legal department, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Missouri,
September 17. 1968. See also, 1921 FED RES. BULL. 1314.
79. In the only case yet to mention Section 7-207, the Court in dictum complains that holders
of duly negotiated receipts ". .. may obtain a proprietary interest in bailed fungibles of
another even though the receipt was not originally issued for the deposit of actual oil...-
Proctor &. Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp., 22 App. Div.
2d 420, 255 NA' S.2d 788 (1965)
80 This is a lawyer's statement. It should be recognized that business considerations could
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negotiable receipts cannot equate adequate policing measures as an
adjunct to reliance upon the warehouseman's honesty.
D. Verification of Issuing Agent's Authority
In the ordinary course of financing, a bank may take warehouse
receipts without questioning the authority of the warehouseman's
agent to issue receipts. It is questioned whether this course of dealing
is safe from the obvious standard attack by a familiar competing
claimant. The feared trustee in bankruptcy or a bonding company
might base a claim of invalidity of receipts on the lack of authority of
the issuing agent.
Despite considerable confusion under the common law, the
Pomerene Act and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act as originally
promulgated,"' the question of the issuer's liability for his agent's acts
now seems fairly well settled by the Code. Section 7-203 provides in
part:
A party to or purchaser for value in good faith of a document of
title other than a bill of lading relying in either case upon the
description therein if the goods may recover from the issuer damages
caused by the non-receipt or misdescription of the goods ....
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 7-102(l)(g) defines "issuer" so as to remove any doubt with
respect to the principal's responsibility:
'Issuer' means a bailee who issues a document . . . . Issuer includes
any person for whom an agent or employee purports to act in issuing a
document if the agent or employee has real or apparent authority to
issue documents, notwithstanding that the issuer received no goods or
dictate the form of receipt. Generally summarized, a comparison of advantages and
disadvantages of negotiable and non-negotiable receipts yields these business differences. (I)
Merchandise may be released upon the order of the named issuee of a non-negotiable receipt;
presentation of a negotiable receipt and cancellation in whole or in part is a necessary
prerequisite to delivery under a negotiable receipt. (2) A lost non-negotiable receipt can be easily
replaced whereas a lost negotiable receipt may only be replaced upon posting bond. (3) Goods
pledged under a non-negotiable receipt are subject to all liens of the warehouseman against the
pledgor; in the case of a negoitable receipt the warehouseman's lien is limited to the specific
charges listed on the receipt. (4) Goods covered by negotiable receipts cannot be levied upon.
(5) Negotiable warehouse receipts should be insured in transit. AMERICAN BANKER'S Assoc., A
BANKER'S GUIDE TO WAREHOUSE RECEIPT FINANCING 8-9 (1966). From the banker's point of
view, the most inconvenient aspect of the negotiable receipt is the requirement of surrender as a
prerequisite to release of goods. The time required for this when the pledgor desires to move
quickly to ship or sell is debilitating.
81. BRAUCHER at 22-23; 2 WILLISTON §§ 419, 419(a), 419(c).
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that the goods were misdescribed or that in any other respect the agent
or employee violated his instructions.
Since sections 1-201(32) and 1-201(44) cause a pledgee bank to be a
purchaser for value, it appears that the warehouseman is bound to the
bank by any receipts which are delivered so long as the agent signing
has at least apparent authority even if the agent has violated his
instructions. However, it must be recognized that the Code provisions
regarding the warehouseman's liability are directed more at the
warehouseman's responsibility for causing damage to depositors
through misdescription or for causing damage to purchasers of
documents who rely on description or the existence of the goods. The
provisions are less concerned with the benefit of the pledgee who seeks
only confirmation that the warehouseman himself owns certain goods.
The receipt issued by the warehouseman in such a case amounts to a
pledge of the goods, particularly if it is issued in the name of the
pledgee. There, the question is not simply whether the agent issuing
the receipt has authority to sign the receipt. One must also ask
whether the agent has authority to make a pledge or grant a security
interest on behalf of his principal. The quantum of authority of the
latter act to be valid is greater than that required simply to sign a
receipt acknowledging that goods have been delivered for storage.
Consequently, it seems necessary to have the borrowing resolution of
the warehouseman specifically refer to and grant appropriate
authority to designated individuals to execute and deliver receipts by
way of pledge. If the pledge is good against the principal, it is also
good against the trustee in bankruptcy.12
I1. MAINTAINING AND PERFECTING SECURITY INTERESTS
Thus far, the focal point has been Article 7. The material has little
relevance to financing arrangements other than those founded upon
warehouse receipts. In order to explore all of the financing problems
involved, it is essential to devote some attention to the influence of
Article 9.
Article 9 is axiomatic in any secured transaction because it
establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the relationships of
secured parties, debtors and other claimants with respect to every
variety of security interest and collateral. Loosely designating the
82 4 H RFMI\GTON, BANKRUPTCY § 1731 (1957).
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giving of a warehouse receipt as security for a debt, it should be
recognized that a "pledge," or a delivery of possession as security is
regarded by the Code as simply another type of security interest.
Since all security interests are brought under the roof of Article 9,
consideration of this form of secured transaction necessarily involves
consideration of all other forms of secured transactions.
Consequently, the following discussion, which is set in the framework
of a bank financing a warehouseman on his fungible inventory, will
apply to relationships considerably broader than those considered in
Part I. The problems of perfection and priority are not restricted to
warehousemen, fungibles or inventory owned by the issuer of a
document. The discussion of how the banker will perfect his security
interest and maintain his secured position is equally applicable to
documentary drafts and letters of credit. Any discussion of priorities
involves review of the entire Code philosophy regarding competing
claimants. Also, one cannot presume to answer the banker's questions
about warehouse receipts without a firm grasp of the relative positions
of purchase money mortgagees and accounts financers.
The banker's primary concern is that his security interest be
perfected. There are a number of problems raised in. determining
which method of perfection should be used and how to insure
continued perfection upon release of the collateral to the
warehouseman for sale or shipment. More important is the realization
that continuity of perfection is not achieved by a single act at the
initiation of a financing arrangement. This fact necessitates the
development of some pragmatic solutions to the following questions:
I. How is perfection of a security interest in documents, goods
covered and the proceeds achieved?
2. How is perfection continued when goods or documents are
released on trust receipt to the debtor for sale or shipment and what
priorities dbes the Code establish among competing claimants to
documents, proceeds and other forms assumed by the collateral?
Part II of this article is necessarily in the nature of a potpourri. A
fortunate aspect is that the general principles involved which apply to
the hypothetical case may be applied to different forms of secured
transactions.
A. Perfection of Security Interests in Documents, Goods and
Proceeds
Perfection is treated in Article 9 of the Code. While perfection with
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/1
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respect to the type of collateral does not present any peculiar
difficulties, it is necessary to understand the theory of the Code as
applied to perfection in negotiable and non-negotiable documents, the
goods covered and the proceeds. Understanding the theory aids in
extrapolating Code rules of priority discussed in the succeeding
section.
Warehouse receipts are classified as "documents" under the Code
definitions in sections 9-105(l)(e) and 1-201(15).13 The Code makes a
basic distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable documents.
The negotiable document embodies title to the goods, 4 so that
possession of a negotiable document is the same as possession of the
goods." Conversely, there is no direct relationship under the Code
between possession of a non-negotiable document and title to the
goods it represents. Title to goods covered by a non-negotiable
document is not embodied in the document. 6 As expected from these
conceptual differences, perfection where negotiable and non-negotiable
documents are involved is treated differently under the Code. There is
83 *'Document' means document of title as defined in the general definitions of Article
I, section 1-201(15).
LI .CC § 9-105()(e).
"Document of Title" includes . . . warehouse receipt . . . and also any other document
which in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing
that the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of . .. the
goods it covers. To be a document of title a document must purport to be issued by, or
addressed to, a bailee and purport -to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are
neither identified or fungible portions of an identified mass.
U.( C 4 1-201(15).
84. I GILMORE § 24.1. A searching, historically analytical treatment of perfection is made in
this treatise. A check-list of the basic differences between negotiable and non-negotiable
documents, § 12.6, emphasizes differences alluded to above, and these distinctions are further
analyzed at § 14.6.2.
85, During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer of a negotiable
document therefor, a security interest in the goods is perfected by perfecting a security
interest in the document, and any security interest in the goods otherwise perfected during
such period is subject thereto.
L C C § 9-304 (3).
86 1 GILMORE § 12.7 at 389-90. For example, the warehouseman's obligation to deliver is
different in the case of goods covered by negotiable and non-negotiable documents. Under
section 7-403(4) the "'person entitled" to goods is the holder of the document, if negotiable. In
the case of a non-negotiable document, the "person entitled" is anyone to whom delivery is to
be made by the terms of or pursuant to written instructions under a non-negotiable document.
They key difference here is that possession or surrender of the non-negotiable document is not a
prerequisite to delivery of goods. The person shown on the warehouseman's books as being the
issuee of a non-negotiable document can control the goods unless as assignee has notified the
warehouseman of his interest.
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actually no Code provision for perfection of a security interest in non-
negotiable documents. This is contrary to the theory that non-
negotiable documents do not represent ownership per se of the
underlying goods.r
A security interest in negotiable documents may be perfected by
possession or filing as provided by sections 9-304(1) and 9-305.11
Recognizing that many transactions involving security interests in
documents are relatively short-term, section 9-304(4) provides for
perfection without filing or possession." This section contemplates
short-term transactions where the secured party may, immediately
upon receiving -the collateral, release it to the debtor so the debtor
may dispose of it and pay the secured party. However, perfection
without filing or possession for such purposes and under such
conditions must be preceded by (1) new value, and (2) a written
security agreement. The security interest so acquired will not, of
course, be good against good-faith purchasers and holders in due
course should the debtor transfer the negotiable instrument or sell the
goods to a third party.
Perfection for non-negotiable documents is governed by section 9-
304(3). As the section illustrates, this is equivalent to perfection on the
goods themselves.
A security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee other than
one who has issued a negotiable document therefor is perfected by
issuance of a document in the name of secured party, or by the bailee's
receipt of notification of the secured party's interest or by filing as to
the goodsf 0
As in the case of negotiable documents, perfection with respect to non-
87. i GILMORE § 12.7 at 389-90.
88. A security interest in chattel paper or negotiable documents may be perfected by filing.
U.C.C. § 9-304(l). Filing, however, is an illusory method in view of the provision:
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of. . . a holder to whom a negotiable document
of title has been duly negotiated... and such holders... take priority over an earlier
security interest even though perfected.
U.C.C. § 9-309.
A security interest in. . . goods, instruments, negotiable documents or chattel paper may
be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-305.
89. A security interest in. . . negotiable documents is perfected without filing or taking
of possession for a period of 21 days from the time it attaches to the extent it arises for
new value given under a written security agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-304(4).
90. U.C.C. § 9-304(3).
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negotiable documents, or the goods covered thereby, may be achieved
without possession or filing, if the secured party gave the bailee
notification of its interest in the goods." Since, under section 7-403(4),
delivery of goods covered by a non-negotiable document can be made
by the bailee without taking a non-negotiable document, the
importance of either notifying the bailee or having the non-negotiable
document issued in the name of the secured party is obvious. Only in
these ways can the secured party holding a non-negotiable document
be certain of control of the goods.
Comparing perfection, without filing or possession, of both
negotiable and non-negotiable documents, Professor Gilmore observes
that perfection on negotiable documents may: last for 21 days; or, in
the case of goods held by a bailee who has not issued a negotiable
document and who has notification, continue indefinitely; or, if filing
is required by Article 9, be non-existent.12 The filing provisions of
Article 9 require filing only in the case of goods covered by a non-
negotiable document when the document is not issued in the na-me of
the secured party or the secured party has not notified the bailee of its
interest in the goods. Filing alone creates a dangerous situation, as a
pledgee procuring a negotiable document from the owner of the goods
will achieve higher priority than the secured creditor relying wholly on
his filing as to the goods. Filing is an alternative method of perfection
in the case of negotiable documents but is not required and is an
illusory method of perfection since a later claimant claiming through
due negotiation and possession of the negotiable document is, under
section 9-309, prior in right even to earlier interests perfected by
filing. It may be concluded that filing alone is not a satisfactory
means of perfection. Without holding a negotiable document, having a
non-negotiable document issued in the secured party's name, or
notifying the bailee, control over the goods and with it any real
protection is lost for practical purposes.
B. Perfection of Security Interests in Proceeds of Documents and
Goods Covered
There are two code provisions relating to the perfection and effect
of a security interest in proceeds. Sections 9-306(2) and 9-306(3)
91 Id
92 I Gi \ioii § 14.6.2 at 458. Filing alone creates a dangerous situation as a pledgee
procuring a negotiable document from the owner of the goods will prime the secured creditor
relying wholly upon his filing as to the goods.
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cover perfection in proceeds in cases where the debtor is solvent.
Section 9-306(4) provides special rules in the case of insolvency.
(1) .. .
(2). Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
in collateral continues notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized by
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by
the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected
security interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected
but it ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected
ten days after the receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral also
covers proceeds; or
(b) the security interest in proceeds is perfected before the expiration
of ten day period.
(4) In the 'event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the
debtor, the secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
has a perfected security interest
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is not
commingled with other money or deposited in a bank account prior
to the insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like,
which are not deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash pro-
ceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the
perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any
cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before
the institution of the insolvency proceedings and commingled
or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency pro-
ceedings less the amount of cash proceeds received by the
debtor and paid over to the secured party during the ten day
period.
It is readily apparent that the proceeds provisions will be
completely irrelevant unless either the warehouseman sells in the
ordinary course of business93 or the bank acquires in disposition of the
93. Under the Code, simply putting goods into a warehouse likely to contain the operator's
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collateral." In any other case, the third party will take subject to the
bank's security interest.
Regarding the proceeds provisions, if the security interest in the
original collateral is perfected, the security interest continues in
identifiable proceeds for a period of ten days following a sale by the
debtor so long as those proceeds are "identifiable" within the Code.
Caution is advised for homogenizing the twenty-one-day grace period
applicable to continue a security interest in goods or documents
released to the debtor with the ten-day grace period during which the
security interest in proceeds continues. It can be seen that the actual
grace period may be as short as ten or as long as thirty-one days. If a
debtor disposes of documents or goods on the day they are released to
him, the secured party has only ten days in which to impress his
interest. If, on the other hand, the documents or goods released are
not disposed of by the debtor for twenty-one days, the secured party still
has another ten days to reach the proceeds.
Clearly the safest course to follow in a program of financing where
warehouse receipts are redistributed to the debtor in express
anticipation of liquidation of the collateral is to file at the outset on
goods, documents and proceeds. If this is accomplished, the security
interest in proceeds will continue so long as the proceeds are
identifiable. There is then no worry about expiration of the ten,
twenty-one or thirty-one day grace period. Filing excuses a bank from
the strictest policing tactics but whether policing tactics should be
relaxed is questionable because of the problem of attempting to trace
proceeds as well as some following unanswerable questions of priority.
C DeliverY of Documents Upon Trust Receipts and Priorities
A mong Claimants to the Goods and Proceeds
The practical lender wants to know, once he is assured of a
perfected security interest, whether his interest may be impeached
either by other creditors or by a trustee in bankruptcy. This requires
exploration of the labyrinth of priorities among security interest under
the Code.
I. General Principles
The Code's basic system of priorities is established in section 9-312.
o'4n goods is sufficient to clothe the operator with such indicia of ownership that buyers from
him take free of adverse interests, U.C.C. § 7-205. See United States v. Haddix & Sons, Inc.,
268 F Supp. K25, 833-34 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (dictum).
94. U C.C 2-403. 7-503(Il.
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This" section, however, is not all-inclusive but refers to other sections
of the Code which deal with specific types of collateral that create
unique problems. The category of documents, which includes
warehouse receipts, is one of the specific types of collateral for which
sections other than section 9-312 may determine priorities. The
necessity of reference to priority rules other than the general rules of
section 9-312 is largely due to some of the peculiar title transferring
qualities of documents. This recognition of "special" qualities is what
makes questions of priority in documents somewhat difficult.
The general priority rules of section 9-312(5) are simple enough and
provide this priority:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing...
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing...
and, in the case of a filed security interest, whether it attached before
or after filing...
(c) in the order of attachment. . . so long as neither is perfected.
The additional concepts injected by these rules are perfection and
attachment. Perfection occurs when the secured party has taken
whatever steps are necessary to give himself an interest in the
collateral that cannot be defeated in insolvency proceedings." The
steps necessary will be determined by the Code provision applicable to
the type of collateral involved. Attachment of the security interest is
not necessarily coterminous with perfection and occurs under section 9-
204(1) when: (1) there is agreement that it attach; (2) value is given;
and (3) the debtor has rights in the collateral. To determine exactly
when this third requirement may be fulfilled is difficult when a sales
situation is involved and may necessitate reference to Article 2 for a
satisfactory resolution. 6
The special inventory purchase money priority created by section 9-
312(3), in substance, is that the purchase money interest is always
prior if (1) it is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral and (2) if other secured parties known to the purchase
money man, or previously filed on the same types of inventory, have
received notification of the purchase money interest prior to the
debtor receiving possession of the collateral.
The sections outside section 9-312 which are relevant to priorities in
95. U.C.C. § 9-301, comment 1.
96. See Moye, Priorities of Inventory and Accounts Financers Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 23 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1014-15 (1968).
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documents and goods covered by documents are sections 9-304 and 9-
309. Section 9-304 states the basic methods for perfection on
documents and goods. It contains the rules of permissive filing,
perfection without filing and perfection without possession or filing
for twenty-one days. It is not a priority section and is useful in
determining when perfection occurs where the first-to-perfect rule is
operative. Section 9-309 creates vastly superior rights in negotiable
documents by providing that holders and persons taking by due
negotiation take priority over earlier security interests even if perfected.
Within this framework, several areas should be noted in which
confusion may develop. The first-to-file rule is simple to apply where
both interests are perfected by filing. Likewise, the first-to-perfect rule
is not particularly difficult where neither competing interest was
perfected by filing. However, when one interest is perfected by filing
and the other by a different means, e.g., possession, particularly if the
filing antedates the other means of perfection, determining priorities
may be confusingY The likelihood of this occuring is great in a
transaction involving financing grounded on documents as collateral.
The chances for conflict over priorities between secured parties are
proportional to the possible means of perfection and the various
possibilities for the time of attachment of security interests. Even the
bank that is cautious enough to file on goods, documents, proceeds
and accounts (such complete coverage is desirable unless there is
reason to accept less) and further holds negotiable documents as its
collateral. may find itself challenged by other secured parties: persons
claiming purchase money security interests, priority under negotiable
documents, priority in accounts and priority in proceeds based on
purchase money security interests in inventory and under negotiable
documents.
An analysis of how such conflicting claims may arise and a
discussion of their resolution is less appropriate than simple
recognition of their possible origins. Since the problem is covered
elsewhere,"" the following discussion is confined to questions of
priority which arise upon or subsequent to the release of documents or
97 See 2 Gi_%IOR § 34.5, at 911-15.
98 See 2 (iILMORE §§ 29.3, 29.4, 34.4, 34.5; Coogan & Gordon, The Ejject of the UniJorm
Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved
Problems. 76 HKR' L. RE 1529, 1553 et seq. (1963); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the
Uniform (ommercial Code, 65 CoLL\1 L. REV. 232 (1965); Moye, supra note 96, and
authorities cited therein.
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goods. It ignores third-party secured creditors who might, even before
release, have been able to claim a conflicting interest.
2. Release on Trust Receipt-Priorities Among Competing
Documents
a. The mechanics. The warehouseman may request the bank to
release warehouse receipts to him so that he can sell the goods, change
the place of storage or the like. The standard practice is to release
documents upon trust receipt delivered to the bank in place of the
document of title. As previously noted," perfection in the goods and
documents continues for twenty-one days after a secured party with a
perfected security interest makes goods or documents available to the
debtor for sale or exchange or related purposes, and for ten days in
any proceeds generated by the goods or documents. These are grace
periods and may be extended by appropriate filings.
During the twenty-one day period, the rights of the secured party in
the document or goods may be terminated by a bona fide purchaser
pursuant to sections 9-307(1) and 7-205. During the ten-day period,
rights in proceeds may be lost under section 9-306 if the proceeds
become unidentifiable.
There is question that without filing on goods, section 9-304 may
provide continued perfection of the bank's security interest in the
goods and if a third-party has previously filed on them, his interest
the bank is perfected as to both the documents and goods covered for
twenty-one days despite redelivery-if the bank has not filed on the
goods and if a third party has previously filed on them, his interest
might advance on the scale of priorities and attach to the goods upon
redelivery of the document to the debtor. This stems from the negative
inference implicit in section 9-304(2) providing:
During the period that goods are in the possession of the issuer of a
negotiable document therefor, a security interest in the goods is
perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document, and any
security interest in the goods otherwise perfected during such period is
subject thereto.
In other words, the only way to perfect in the case of negotiable
documents is by possession. By negative implication, the converse is
that if at a certain point in time there is no filing as to goods and the
99. See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
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document is not in possession, someone might perfect a security
interest in the goods. Likewise, if perfection on goods covered by a
non-negotiable document has been achieved without filing either by
issuance of the document in the name of the secured party or by
notification to the bailee of the secured party's interest, one might
argue for the same result. This should not be the result in any case
since section 9-304(5)(a) recognizes a continuing security interest
where documents are released. 100 If the security interest is continuing,
presumably there is nothing for the prior interest to claim. The
solution is to avoid any question by filing as to both goods and
documents and verifying that there is no prior filing.
b. The Philadelphia National Bank Case. There are no cases under
the sections of the Code dealing with the basic hypothetical case, but
the opinion of Carl W. Funk who arbitrated Philadelphia National
Bank, has been published in Funk, Trust Receipt v. Warehouse
Receipts- Which Prevails When They Cover the Same Goods?1 ' This
"decision" has been celebrated for its astute reasoning and may serve
as a guide in all situations involving priorities among document
holders.
Boody was financing Wool Company and filed on both documents
of title and wool in Wool Company's possession. Wool Company
delivered a trust receipt to Boody and obtained delivery of wool.
Wool Company then placed the wool in a public warehouse. Wool
Company had the warehouse issue a non-negotiable warehouse receipt
to Wagman as security for a loan. Neither Wagman nor the
warehouseman knew of Boody's earlier security interest in the goods.
Wool Company became insolvent and it was discovered that the wool
was covered both by Boody's trust receipt and Wagman's warehouse
receipt.
It was stipulated that both Boody and Wagman had perfected
security interests, Boody through filing on documents and goods and
holding a trust receipt and Wagman by virtue of a non-negotiable
warehouse receipt issued in its name. The arbitrator examined the
rules of prioity in section 9-312 and determined that since one of the
interests was not perfected by filing, section 9-312(5)(b), the "first to
perfect rule," was the starting point for determining priorities. Boody,
100 See 2 GILMORE § 26.7, at 698.
101. Funk, Trust Receipt v. Warehouse Receipts- Which Prevails When The)' Cover the
Same Goods, 19 Bus. LAw. 627 (1964).
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the first-to-perfect, appeared to be the winner. The arbitrator pointed
out that if Wagman had a purchase money interest, it might have
prevailed under section 9-312(3). Additionally, if Wagman had been a
buyer in the ordinary course of business, it would have taken free of
Boody's security interest under section 9-307. However, Wagman was
not a buyer in the ordinary course of business since "buying" defined
by section 1-201(9) does not include a transfer as security.
Recognizing that this priority dispute involved competition between
documents, the arbitrator turned elsewhere to determine whether any
other provision would override Boody's apparent victory. It was noted
that section 9-312(l) made section 9-309 controlling on priorities of
security interests in documents. Section 9-309 thus was the deciding
factor for Boody:
Nothing in this Article limits the rights of a holder in due course of
a neogitable instrument. . . or a holder to whom a negotiable
document of title has been dul' negotiated. . . hnd such holders or
purchasers take priority over an earlier security interest even though
perfected. Filing under this Article does not constitute notice of the
security interest to such holders or purchasers.
Under this section, if Wagman had taken a negotiable warehouse
receipt and if the receipt has been duly negotiated according to section
7-501, Wagman could have prevailed over Boody who held a mere
trust receipt. This case illustrates that negotiable receipts should
always be taken as collateral.
In the Boody dispute, the arbitrator found that Article 7 was not
inconsistent with the result since particular attention was given to
section 7-503(1) which reads:
(1) A document of title confers no right in goods against a person
who before issuance of the document had a legal interest or perfected
security interest in them and who neither:
(a) delivered or entrusted them or any document of title covering
them to the bailor with actual or apparent authority to ship, store or
sell or with power to obtain delivery under this Article [(Section 7-
403) dealing with the obligation of the warehouseman to deliver]
or with power of disposition under this Act [(Sections 2-403 and 9-307)
dealing with power to pass title to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business] or other statute or rule of law; nor
(b) acquiesced in the procurement of the bailor or his nominee of
any document of title. (Bracketed material added.)
It was argued that since Boody did entrust documents and goods to
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Wool County thus enabling it to create the conflict, the converse of
this language should cause Wagman's document of title to confer
paramount rights. The arbitrator found, however, that section 7-
503(l) did not compel that result and that the Code did not divest an
entrustor such as Boody of all its rights.
The implication to be drawn from [§7-503(1)] is that where
entrusting occurs (under circumstances where there is authority to ship,
store, sell, dipose of. obtain delivery or a document of title) and a
document is then issued, the holder of that document (here being
Wagman) acquires some rights. What they are must be found elsewhere
in the Code. The Comments show clearly that the draftsmen [of §7-
503(1)] were thinking primarily of the situation where a 'commercial
trustee' sold the goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of business or
procured a negotiable document of title which he negotiated to someone
else . . . There is nothing in the Comments to indicate that it was
intended to confer a similar paramount position on the holder of a non-
negotiable document, and the section therefore does not override the
priority granted to Boody by Article 9, nor is it inconsistent with
anything in that Article."'2
The arbitrator must have assumed that the bailment by Wool
Company was authorized or that Boody acquiesced in the
procurement by Wool Company of a document of title. Otherwise, the
document held by Wagman would have been the fruit of an
unauthorized bailment and would have under section 7-503(1), prima
facie, conferred no rights.1 03
The Boodv arbitrator submits that under the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, a person to whom a receipt was transferred but not
negotiated acquired no better title to the goods than that possessed by
his transferor. And, furthermore, that the Uniform Act drew a
distinction similar to the Code's distinction between due negotiation,
or negotiable receipts, and the acceptance of non-negotiable receipts.
Although the Uniform Trust Receipts Act exposed an entrustor to
102. Id at 633 (parenthetical remarks supplied).
103 ( ompare BRkU CHER at 62-63. See also Dunagan v. Griffin, 151 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941 ). where cases of beer which had been entrusted to a carrier for transport were placed
in a warehouse and the negotiable receipt thereby procured pledged for a loan. The true owner
of the beer was able to assert paramount title to that of the pledgee, the court stating that the
carrier could no more pass title to the beer by way of the receipt than he could by way of sale of
the goods. Id at 254. However, even a non-negotiable document could defeat the rights of an
entruster it the trustee procuring the document had a power of disposition-if, for example, he
was a dealer in the goods, and sold the document instead of pledging it. See 2 GILNIORE § 25.4,
at 665-66
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loss if the trustee obtained and wrongfully negotiated a negotiable
document or sold the goods to buyers in the ordinary course of
trade,104 there was no protection for a pledgee, (by definition, not a
buyer in the ordinary course of business) or another taking a non-
negotiable document from the trustee. The arbitrator concluded:
If, as a matter of policy, the rule should now be changed to meet the
demands of commerce, and non-negotiable receipts issued in the name
of a bank and delivered to it should be given the same protection as
negotiable receipts similarly delivered, this must be done by amendment
to the Code.05
It appears that the arbitrator could have relied more upon section 7-
504. Had he referred to it, he would not have felt compelled to refer
to the law under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Section 7-504
provides:
(1) A transferee of a document whether negotiable or non-negotiable,
to whom the document has been delivered but not duly negotiated,
acquires the title and rights which his transferor had or had actual
authority to convey.1 6
Wagman, as a transferee of a non-negotiable document, obtains
only such rights as his transferor, Wool Company. Wool Company
had no actual authority to convey any interest. To the contrary,
transfer of any interest was presumably interdicted by Boody's trust
receipt. Comment 2 to section 7-504 recognizes that transfer of the
non-negotiable document contrasts with transfer of the goods
themselves as estoppel and agency principals will not, in the case of a
non-negotiable document, avail to give the transferor power to convey
greater rights than he actually has by using non-negotiable receipts. It
is unnecessary to rely on estoppel or agency in the case of one who
holds a negotiable receipt. He will prevail over anyone at any time.
There is nothing an inventory financer can do to defeat the right of
one taking by due negotiation from one who holds the inventory for
sale.107
c. Epilogue. The bank has priority over a subsequent pledgee of
goods (upon release of documents or goods) only where the
104. See Commercial Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239
U.S. 520 (1915), discussed in 2 GILMORE § 25.2, at 660-61.
105. Funk, note 101 supra, at 635.
106. U.C.C. § 7-504.
107. 2 GILIORE § 25.4, at 666.
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subsequent pledgee takes a non-negotiable receipt or where the bank is
the first to file. In other cases, as in the case of sale, the bank's right
depends upon its ability to trace proceeds as provided in section 9-
306.
Another reason for taking a negotiable receipt is that only under a
negotiable document can the bank terminate the rights of an unpaid
seller of the pledged goods.100  This, however, produces the
anomalous result of one without title, or with voidable title, little
better than a thief, being able to pass better title than he could by
virtue of having procured negotiable receipts under section 7-
503(i)(a). In this situation, because the holder of the legal interest
delivered the goods under circumstances that enabled the bailee to
obtain delivery, the bailee can cut off the seller's equities. The pledgee
gets not only his pledgor's title, but also that title the pledgor is able
to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value.
3. Priorities Where Competing Claimants Do Not Hold Documents
The Philadelphia National Bank case will dispose of any contest
between competing secured parties who, as a result of either repledge
or sale, are both asserting rights derived from documents. One can
visualize, however, competitors who do not claim under documents. If a
bank releases on trust receipt or otherwise takes advantage of the
twenty-one day period of section 9-304(4) for perfection without filing
or possession the possible sources for competing claims by non-docu-
ment holders would be limited to four:109
1. A buyer in the ordinary course of business-he wins against the
bank.11"
2. A buyer not in the ordinary course of business-he loses against
the bank."'
3. One who has filed on the goods themselves, before release of
the document, e.g., an inventory financer under an after acquired
property clause-he wins against the bank claiming under a non-
108 See BRALCHIER at 76-77.
109 The four named are the most obvious. Some competitors who are not so obvious and
ther relative rights are discussed in the authorities cited at note 98 supra. The rights of these not-
so-obvious competitors would all, however, be at least inchoate by the time the bank releases on
trust receipt
110 1 C.C § 2-403, 7-205, 9-307(1); see 2 GILMORE § 26.6. It is to be remembered that a
"buyer" under U.C.C. § 1-201(9) does not include a pledgee.
III l IC C k 2-403, 7-205, 9-307(1); see 2 GILMORE § 26.6.
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negotiable document, loses against the bank claiming under a
negotiable document."2
4. One who has filed on the goods themselves after release of the
document-he loses to the bank." 3
D. Competition For Proceeds
1. The Possible Competitors
Still to be considered is what the bank has remaining if the
documents and goods are gone and only the proceeds remain. As
noted, the Code makes some distinctions between proceeds held by
solvent and insolvent debtors. Proceeds in the hands of insolvent
debtors, or the trustee in bankruptcy will be treated later.
First, a security interest in "identifiable" proceeds is good for 10
days without filing, or continuously if a financing statement covering
proceeds has been filed." 4 It is important to recognize that only
"identifiable" proceeds may be directly traced into the hands of third
parties and the bank cannot reclaim the delinquent debtor's
dissipations without discretion. Although the bank's right to set-off
cannot be denigrated,"5 deposits in another bank will cause proceeds
such as checks to lose their "identifiable" nature and put such funds
beyond reach, except in the case of insolvency.
Once "identifiable" proceeds are located, it may be necessary to
compete for them with other secured parties. For example, if the bank
locates the proceeds of a sale in the form of an account, the bank
might be confronted by another secured party who is financing
receivables. There might be one claiming that he, and not the bank,
112. Since there is a distinction between a non-negotiable document and the goods themselves,
as previously pointed out, the general priority rule of U.C.C. § 9-312(5) governs here and grants
the encumbrancer of after-acquired property priority against any bank which cannot qualify for
purchase money priority under U.C.C. § 9-309. Professor Gilmore feels that the future advance
priority problem is unlikely to arise where documents are involved so long as the document
holder attains the status of a duly negotiated holder. 2 GILMORE § 35.8, at 943.
113. It has already been discussed and resolved that this case presents a question which
should be resolved in favor of the bank. See text following note 99 supra.
114. U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
115. See generally, Bankruptcy Act § 68, II U.S.C. § 108 (1964); 10 A.%t. JUR. 2d Banks
§§ 669-71 (1963). The right to set-off, however, may be qualified in any state which does not
recognize the right to set-off the unmatured debt of an insolvent depositor, e.g., Brown v. Stotts
City Bank, 327 Mo. 753, 38 S.W.2d 722 (1931). Maturity of the indebtedness is not a
qualification under the Bankruptcy Act, 9 At. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 514 (1963), so the obvious
answer is to include an acceleration provision conditioned on insolvency in any course of
financing.
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was prior in right with respect to the underlying collateral. Ignore this
claimant for he might be: a purchase money man; a non-purchase
money inventory man filed on after acquired property and proceeds
where the bank was not; one who had released goods covered by
documents on trust receipt and filed as to goods, documents and
proceeds, or any variation of these.
2. The Adverse Secured Party-Accounts
To simplify discussion, the adverse secured party claiming under a
purchase money security interest that has "shifted," enabling him to
assert a continuing priority in proceeds, will be ignored. There is no
satisfactory solution to that problem."6 Neither will the claims to
proceeds arising from an earlier priority in the underlying collateral
be discussed."7 Whether or not an interest in proceeds should be or is
entitled to the same priority as the interest in the original collateral is
unresolved."
The Code does not seek to resolve contests between secured parties
for proceeds when neither party can identify their source. Since the
sine qua non of the assertion of rights to proceeds is the identification
of the proceeds generated by one's collateral, for secured parties A
and B to be disputing the same proceeds simply means that one, or
both, are unable to accurately identify the proceeds of his collateral.
If proceeds are identifiable they may be pursued. If proceeds are not
identifiable, they are lost, except in the case of cash in bank accounts.
The Code resolves only the conflict between A claiming the proceeds
qua proceeds and B claiming the same items as accounts or original
collateral. The exception to this is the case of a competing secured
party asserting a claim to the same underlying collateral.
In the case of the warehouseman who sold a bank's collateral, the
proceeds of sale will usually be limited to cash, negotiable instruments
in the form of checks, drafts or accounts. If the proceeds are cash
which has been mingled in a bank account or with other cash, they
116 2 GILMORE § 29.4. After a trip through a statutory chamber of horrors, Professor
Gilmore himself states it it would be folly to predict what a court would do in the case of a
purchase money secured party claiming a continuing priority in proceeds which were, say,
accounts, over a party who has previously filed on accounts, and describes his analysis as
constituting - . . as undigestible a passage as can be found in the entire range of the legal
literature Id at 796,
117 See authorities cited note 98, supra.
118 See. eg, Coogan & Gordon, supra note 98, at 1557 et seq; Henson, supra note 98, at
text following note 27; Move, supra note 96, at 1017.
Vol. 1969: 105]
Washington University Open Scholarship
148 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
are no longer identifiable and the lender will suffer the loss,"' unless,
the lender is a bank and the right to set-off can be exercised or unless
actual insolvency has occurred. 20 If the proceeds are negotiable
instruments, they likewise are beyond reach to the extent they have
been negotiated.' 2'
If the proceeds are accounts, the answer is not as simple. The Code
by not referring to accounts in the priority context, recognizes the
lack of pre-Code litigation with respect to proceeds other than chattel
paper and non-negotiable instruments. 22 Consequently, there are no
special rules for determining priorities between an inventory financer
holding a derivative claim to an account as proceeds and the financer
of receivables whose claim to an account is direct.12' With no Code
provision giving the purchaser of an account priority over one who
has a perfected interest in the account derived from a continuing
interest in inventory, perhaps the inventory secured party should take
precedence over the receivables financer . 2  Alternatively, there is a
continuity of perfection extending to proceeds which began as a
security interest in inventory, so that the account is already
encumbered when created, leaving nothing that the account receivable
financer's interest can attach.
There is no clear order of priorities in proceeds. 25 To avoid this
problem, debtors must be required to deposit cash and negotiable
proceeds in a collateral account and financers must not rely on
receivables as collateral unless priority is assured through proper
filing.
3. The Trustee in Bankruptcy-Proceeds
The Code relaxes the rules somewhat when tracing cash proceeds on
insolvency. In substance, section 9-306(4) provides that in the event of
119. See 2 GILMORE § 27.4, at 735.
120. If actual insolvency has occurred, the special rule of U.C.C. § 9-306(4), hereinafter
discussed, will extend some rights to mingled bank accounts.
121. U.C.C. § 9-306.
122. U.C.C. § 9-308 (purchasers giving new value and taking possession of chattel paper or
non-negotiable instruments may take free of prior perfected security interest if without
knowledge of the interest). See generally 2 GILMORE §§ 25.5, 27.3.
123. 2 GILMORE § 27.4, at 733.
124. 2 GILMORE § 27.4, at 732-33. Professor Gilmore notes the problem of competition
between the purchase money inventory financer claiming accounts as proceeds and the
receivables secured party making advances against accounts as they arise. Id. at n.5.
125. 2 GILMORE §§ 29.3, 29.4, 34.4, 34.5; Coogan & Gordon, supra note 98, at 1555-58;
Henson, supra note 98; Moye, supra note 96, and authorities cited therein.
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insolvency, the secured party with a perfected interest in proceeds has
a perfected security interest in (a) identifiable non-cash proceeds, (b)
identifiable cash proceeds (i.e., cash which has not been commingled),
(c) identifiable cash proceeds such as checks which have not been
deposited in a bank account and (d) in all cash and bank accounts of
the debtor. However, the secured party's interest in such commingled
funds is (a) subject to the right of setoff and (b) further limited by the
somewhat complicated formula of section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) which
prohibits reaching any funds which have been in the account more
than ten days. 2 1 The significance of this section is that mingling, when
insolvency is involved, does not preclude tracing the proceeds to their
source. Additionally, the secured party need not show that any
portion of a bank account is a product of the sale of his collateral in
order to claim an interest in the mingled fund. 127 While commentators
recognize a historical stumbling block in this provision, which appears
to give the secured party an automatic priority in assets
unencumbered to the time of insolvency, it is agreed that this is not
the effect of the provision and that it should withstand attack.2 8
CONCLUSION
It is gratifying that there are not more difficulties in the application
of the Code to this topic. Despite a few complexities and uncertainties,
in nearly every instance where complexities render the outcome
uncertain, alert forecasting will avert dealing with them. For instance,
the simple expedient of checking state law for peculiar requirements
imposed upon warehousemen will avoid arguing Code pre-emption
with regard to regularity in form and issuance of receipts. Further-
more, there is little chance of a conflicting claim to collateral if ap-
propriate filings are made, particularly if the lender is aware of the
expedience of being a "duly negotiated holder."
Nor should one neglect the importance of business efficiency in
financing warehousemen. The primary dictates of financing consist of
knowledge of the debtor and strict adherence to a program of
supervision including constant communication vith the debtor when
126 Professor Gilmore restates the formula and lists the.steps involved in its application in 2
GILMORE s 45 9, at 1338-39.
127 Id
128 Id at 1339-44; Henson, "'Proceeds" under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM.
L RE% 232 (1965).
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goods are released on trust receipt. Collateral consisting of fungibles
is highly violatile in that, through warehouse receipts and bills of
lading, it can be readily dissipated. It is also volatile because it can be
created by the stroke of a pen where it doesn't exist and removed by
operation of law through no fault of the warehouseman. A survey of
the practical commentary on the subject of financing on warehouse
receipts will provide ample suggestions for reducing such risks."'0
It is hoped that Code revisionists will consider the doctrine of
appropriation as applied to the warehouseman's own creditors and
some of the unique questions of priority created by the later secured
party taking negotiable documents. Until these areas are clarified, an
appreciative approach to financing the warehouseman on his own
fungibles will save considerable uncertainty.
129. HARRIS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, VAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AND THEIR USE IN FINANCING
(1964); NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, WAREHOUSE RECEIPT FINANCING (1965); THE
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, A BANKER'S GUIDE TO VAREHOUSE RECEIPT FINANCING
(1965).
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